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THE INFLUENCE OF AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS ON REAL
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT Supriyaningsih, Fuad1 DeRartment of
Accounting, Faculty of Economics and Business Diponegoro University" JI.
Prof. Soedharto SH TembalangSemarang, Indonesia 50239. Phone:
+622476486851 ABSTRACT Current study tests the impact of audit
committees to the real earnings management. Using the manufacturing
public listed companies from Indoensia Stock Exchange from 2012 until
2014, we found that that financial and accounting_~2mertise of audit
committee members and audit committee size have positive effect on real
earnings management. Furthermore, we also found that the dual
positions of the audit committee chairman have a negative effect on
earnings management. The Tenure of audit committee chairman however,
has no imRact on real earnings management. Keywords: real earning~
management" characteristics of audit committee, good corRorate
governance" agency theory. INTRODUCTION Indonesia Stock Exchange
(IDX) has required all listed companies to implement good corporate
governance. This is because the good corporate governance is a tool to
connect the company management with board of directors and
stakeholders. Based on this, Indonesia Stock Exchange issued a regulation
No: Kep-315 / BEJ / 06/ -2000 enhanced with regulations No .: Kep-339/
BEJ / 07 / -2001 on July 1, 2001 related to the establishment of an audit
committee, independent commissioner and board secretary of listed
companies. Indonesia Stock Exchange reconfirmed the rules with the
issuance of Bapepam Chairman Decree No .: Kep-29 / PM / 2004, in which
the contents of the decision requires companies listed on the Stock
Exchang~ to The regulations require a minimum
of thre,,;;, independent people who make up the audit committee. One of the
three members is from an independent commissioner who will be the
chairman of the audit committee. In addition, one of the three members
must have expertise and capabilities in the field of accounting and finance.
With three members, the board formed an audit committee in order to
assist the 1Corresponding author commissioners in their duties. The audit
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subsidies from the government committee has a role in helping
(Subramanyam and Wild, 2013). commissioners in overseeing the
Earnings management can be management doing the financial reporting
categorized into the accrual earnings process. The role makes the audit
committee management and real earnings management, is often linked to
the quality of financial based on whether or not to have a direct reporting.
The existence of the audit impact on cash flow. Accrual management
committee should be able to improve the earnings are earnings
manipulation using quality of financial reporting and company's methods
and accounting estimates that are internal control quality that aims to
provide not a direct impact on cash flow. Instead, the protection to
shareholders. real earnings management is earnings Nevertheless, within
the last ten manipulation using operational activities years many scandals
appeared related to that directly affect to the cash flow. Real financial
reporting. That makes the earnings management is known in the post
effectiveness of audit committees in Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) period.
overseeing the financial reporting process in Compared by accrual
earnings management, the company was often questioned (Vafeas real
earnings management has received little in Putri, 2011). The collapse of
several large attention in the research literature. companies that never
happened raises Therefore, this study focuses on real questions related to
supervision by the board earnings management. of directors and the audit
committee due to Roychowdhury (2006) the manipulation of doing
accounting comprehensively investigate earnings records. Those
manipulation activities are management through real activities. known as
earnings management (earnings According to Roychowdhury (2006)
management). earnings management through real activities According to
Schipper (1989), is activity originating from normal earnings management
is interference in the operational practices, which encouraged
determination of earnings that is done manager desire to mislead some
deliberately for personal gain. Earnings stakeholders as a general
statement users management can occur for several reasons, into believing
that certain financial reporting such as to increase the manager purposes
has been fulfilled in a credible form compensation, boost stock prices, and
get of operational operation. Research results show that managers
typically take three TSHupErIiNyaFnLiUnEgsNiChE OF AUDIT COMMITTEE
CHARACTERISTICS ON REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT Fuad Diponegoro
University types of activity manipulation of real activity, namely (1)
manipulation of the sale, (2) a reduction in discretionary costs (general
and administrative expenses and cost of sales), and (3) excessive
production (overproducing). Earnings management actions undertaken by
management is the accounting reality that is difficult to accept by the
user, can damage the credibility of financial reporting (Subramanyam and
Wild, 2013). The responsibility of the board of commissioners is to act as
representatives of the shareholders in all respects, so the commissioners
must supervise the manager to restrict the activity of the real
manipulation. Although the audit committee plays a major role in the
regulatory process of financial reporting, it is unclear whether the audit
committee can effectively inhibit the activity of real earnings management.
Research related to the effectiveness of the audit committee have been
done, but until now there are still few empirical evidences that founded
about bs;'.I'LttL<:".cOt:).' ;:~i.'::;::'-.":L._::. impact real earnings
management. Visvanathan (2008) used data pre-SOX to examine the
relationship between real earnings management and three ~tlQ[i1!~~lj.?iti£2
speci fi ca IIy th e th e ."'..~..'~.'.,,",.~_".'.!;.'..:..;-'-"''''' ",'
the size, frequency audit committee :..C';':~"·'...:"-'-'::;J:,: ..;:.
The results showed that tbe Jreguency of audit committee meeting~
negatively affect the real income related management discretionary cost
reductions, but not for the manipulation of sales activity and activity
overproducting. Mughni (2014) had a research related to the influence of
the characteristics of the audit committee and audit Q!"iaiity on earning~
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lllani'!..gemer:;tc_J_r.!.:'.; characteristics the audit committee III used, which is
a measure of the" ,':.10, financial h-~~;:;,,:,,-t.st:' (If d~l(;!,- u:;iTILllLtLCc'_
mernb ~r01 the nUnlt:~;of audit committee Il!eetiil<J~,Th· results showed
that only financial expertise that have a significant effect on earning~
management. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES
DEVELOPMENT Agency theory is a theory that describes the relationship
between the agent and the principal. On the one hand manager have a
role to be agent and on the other as the principal (owner of the company)
(Hendriksen and Breda, 1992). Agency theory occurs because of a conflict
of interest between the principal (owner) and agent (management). In the
agency theory all individuals are assumed to do things just based on their
self-serving. The owners (principals) are assumed to be mainly interested
in the acquisition of the yield on the investment that the owners do on a
company. While management (agent) is assumed to receive compensation
that is derived from a monthly compensation and also compensation
gained from involvement in an agency relationship (Anthony and
Govindarajan, 2011). This conflict of interest raises the existence of
information asymmetry. Asymmetry of information is an imbalance gained
between information of manager as a provider of information to the
shareholders and stakeholders in general as consumers of information.
There are two kinds of information asymmetry, namely: Adverse selection,
which is compared with the shareholders, the management is know more
information about the situation and prospects of company .That condition
can cause the information given to the principal does not fully rendered by
the agent. Moral hazard, which is shareholders doesn't know all the
activities doing by the management, so that management can take action
beyond the knowledge of shareholders. Such actions constitute a breach of
contract and not ethically. Implementations of basic earnings management
can be explained by the theory agency. Earnings management occurs
because of a conflict of interest between the principal andagents.
Management has more information than shareholder so that it can trigger
asymmetric information.Asymmetry information involve management to
have motivation and strong chance to practice earning management. User
of financial report difficult to accept earning management practice by
management. Earning management can decrease credibility of financial
reporting. Schipper (1989) contend that earning management is
management's interference for determining of company's profit to gain
individual motive. There are several reasons from management doing
earnings management, among which is to raise stock prices by increase
profits, increasing manager compensation, and to get subsidies from the
government. Roychowdhury (2006) comprehensively investigate earnings
management through real activities. His research states that the
management usually doing three types of activity manipulation of real
activity, namely: Sales Manipulation Manipulation is defined as the sales
manager effort to increase sales during the years for the purpose of
achieving profit targets. Management generates additional sales by
offering a limited discount price and by offering soft credit terms. As a
result, sales volume increased and resulted in higher income for the year
but the cash flow decreased due to smaller cash inflows due to credit sales
and discounts offered. Reducing Discretionary Expenses Management can
increase profits by reducing discretionary costs. Cost discretionary
companies consist of cost of sales, R & D costs, marketing costs, and
general and administrative expenses. Overproducing Manufacturing
companies can carry out large-scale production (overproducing) is to
produce the goods in larger quantities than is needed in order to achieve
the expected demand so that profit will increase. With this excessive
production of fixed overhead costs divided by the number of units of goods
in large quantities would bring the cost Rer unit and the cost of goods sold
decreased. The decline on cost of goods sold will result increasing
QRerating margins. Company should strive to reduce their earning
manipulation with doing implementation of good corporate governance.
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Good corporate governance achievable with formed an audit committee.
The audit committee is a committee formed by the board of directors in
order to help carry out its duties and functions. According Tugiman (1995)
the audit committee is a grouR of ReoRle elected Qy' a larg~grouR to do a
Rarticular job or to Rerform sRecific tasks or the number of commissioners
of client companies are responsible to assist the auditor in maintaining
their independence from management. Their audit committee is expected
to be able to improve the quality of financial reporting produced by
management and is also expected to be able to improve the company's
internal control aimed at giving protection to shareholders. This study
examineanything of the characteristics of audit committee that can reduce
the activity of earnings management. Characteristics of the audit
committee are independent variables in this study. Characteristics of the
audit committee used that is eXQertise financial accounting and audit
committee members, the size of the audit committee, tenure the
chairman of the audit committee, and the number of positions that were
held by the chairman of the audit committee. The framework in this study,
namely: Picture 1.1 Research Framework Hypothesis Development
Financial and AccountingExpertise of Audit Committee Member The first
characteristic of audit committee is financial and accounting expertise of
audit committee members. Members with financial and accounting
expertise can enhance the supervisory function owners of the company
(the principal) on the management (agent) in order not to harm the owner
of the company. Based on the Decree of Chairman of BaReRam Number:
KeR- 29/ PM / 2004 stating that one of the three members of the audit
committee must have an educational background in accounting or
finance. Knowledge in the field of accounting and finance can be used as
the basis for audit committee members in their duties. Financial and
accounting~Rertise of audit committee members are expected to reduce
Q. material misstatement in presenting financial statements so as to reduce
the activity of earnings manipulation by management. Thus, the greater
the audit committee members with eXRertise in accounting and finance
make the quality of financial reporting for the better and secure. Previous
research showed that the accounting and financial eXRertise of audit
committee members can facilitate the audit committee to be more
effective in controlling th~ financial reporting process.Bedard et aI.,
(2004) showed that aggressiveness earningmanagementnegatively
affected with accounting and financial eXRertise of audit committee
members. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) found that accounting
conservatism §..Rositively' related with financial and accounting~Rertise
of audit committee members. Based on the above explanation, the first
hy.Rothesis" that is: H1: Financial and accounting eXRertise of audit
committee members has negative effect on real earnings management,
Audit Committee Size The second characteristic of audit committee is
audit committee size, Audit committee size help oversee the management
(agent) that does not harm the owner (the principal). The larger of the
audit committee size oversight of management (agents) in the conduct of
financial reporting becomes more increased. Based on the Decree of
Chairman of BaReRam Number: KeR.: 29/ PM / 2004 which requires the
contents of the audit committee consisting of at least three independent
people. The amount of audit committees are more likely to have members
with expertise varied to monitor the practices of financial reporting done
by management (agent) is more effective, so that the owner (principal)
was reporting produced have good quality and guaranteed {Baxter and
Cotter, 2009) ..•.Thus, the larger of the audit committee size is expected to
reduce their earning manipulation activities by management. Based on the
above explanation, the second hy.Rothesis, that is: H2: Audit committee
size negatively affect to the real earnings management. Tenure Chairman
of Audit Committee The third characteristic of audit committee istenure
chairmanof audit committee. Tenure chairmanof audit committeewith a
long tenure can improve owner's company (principal) supervision toward
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the management (agent). Chairman of the audit committee with a long
tenure has greater the experience and expertise oversight of financial
reporting, so we can easily find misstatements made by management. The
longer tenure chairman of the board can gain relevant knowledge related
to chairman's job from time to time to improve the performance of their
work (Fiedler, 1970 in Sun and Lan 2014). Beasley (1996) found that
manipulation of financial statements has possible lower value than the
company had an average longer tenure chairman of the board. Therefore,
the chairman of audit committee with a long tenure is expected to be more
effective in overseeing the management compared than chairman of the
audit committee who has shorter tenure, so that the resulting financial
reporting will be more qualified. Based on this eXRlanation, the third
hy.Rothesis is: H3: Tenure chairman of the audit committee negatively
affect toward the real earnings management. The Number of Positions that
were be Held by the Chairman of Audit Committee The fourth
characteristic of audit committee is the number of positions that were is
held by--.!;hechairman of g_~jdiJ;J;.Qmrnit~~!The chairman of qudit
comrnittee has double positions outside the company can gain experience
and greater expertise in monitoring managers (Bedard et aI., 2004 L
Another that, the chairman of audit cornmittee may also have Q great
reputation to motivate his members so that it can work better (Shivdasani,
1993 in Sun and Lan 2014). A large number of positions that were be held
by the chairman of audit committee should be able to reduce earning~
management activities conducted by the management (agent), so that
owner's company (the principal) can feel confident about the financial
reporting because it has better quality. Bedard et aI., (2004) proved
earnings management is negatively related to the average number of
positions that were be held by the chairman of audit committee outside
the company. The results showed that the number of positions that were
be held by the chairman of audit committee outside the company more
effective to detain the earnings management. Based on the above
explanation, the fourth hy.Rothesis is: H4: The number of positions that
were be held by the chairman of audit committee negatively affects toward
the real earnings management. RESEARCH METHODS POQulation and
SarnRle The ROQulation in this research is manufacturing cornRanies listed
Ln.Jndonesia SJoc;:k_Exchang~_1!U2eriod2012- 2014. The reason for using a
manufacturing company as a population is because the population in the
manufacturing sector is more than other sectors. In addition, the data
contained in the financial statements on manufacture companies is more
complete and complex. The data used are the financial statements and
annual reports for three years from 2012 to 2014. The reason for using
the data for 2012-2014 is because the data year 2012-2014 provide an
overview of Supriyaningsih Fuad Diponegoro University the current
condition of the company which is the latest data of the company. The
sampling technique used in this research is purposive sampling, is a
technique commonly used in the sampling process based on certain
criteria predetermined. The criteria were used: (1) Company listed on the
Stock Exchange and issued financial statements and annual reports in a
row and complete for the period ended December 31, 2012 to 2014; (2)
manufacturing company issued financial statements using the currency of
rupiah; and (3) the company used as a sample is a company with full
information relating to the calculation indicators and variables used in this
study. Table 1 Purposive Sampling Explanation Amount Manufacturing
comRanies listed in Indonesia S~ock Exchange in Reriod 2012-2014
COIJ}Ranl~~ that do not meet the criteria Companies thatmeet the criteria
Outlier 688 (544) 144 (33) Total samples within 3 years 111 Source:
Secondary data were processed, 2016 Measurement of Real Earnings
Management This study. uses real earnings management as the dependent
variable. Real earning~ management Is earnings manipulation by using
the operations that directly impact on cash flow. Based on previous
research, measurement of real earnings management in this study. uses
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the calculation concept of Royhowdhury (2006) which uses three
approaches, specifically: the abnormal Rroduction cost caused by_
manipulation of the manufacturing_Rrocess,. the abnormal oRerating cash
flow caused by manipulation of sales activity, and discretionary expenses
caused by the manipulation of operating expenses. The first step is
calculating the cost of nO[I]JSlJ_Rroduction(PROQ),discretionary. expense
(DISX), and operating cash flow (CFO) following the results of the
regression for each company. The second step is calculating the normal
rate on PROD, CFO, and DISX separately. The concept for the calculation
of the normal level of Rroduction costs (PROD), normal levels of operating
cash flow (CFO), and normal levels of discretionary expense (DISX), are:
Normal Level of Production Costs (PROD) [PROD] t/A (t-l) [1(= a (Q.)
)+ 13_CLLlLA_Jt-l) + 13_G. ) S ..1fA....Ct-1) + 13_ei) [llS)l t/A (t-1)
+ 13_(1) [llS L(t-1).llL(U) + which: tLCL.1L.::=--.1Qtal5set inyear tool
S ...J = Net sales lILyear t llS. t = variance of net sales from year U
to t [PROD] _t= production cost in year t 0_0 = Constanta 13_(1-4) =
Coefisien E = error Normal Level of Operating Cash Flow (CFO) [CFO L
..1fA....(t-1} D(= a _(Q. ) )+ 13_(LL1L8_-<t-1) + 13_(£J S t/A (t-1) + 13
_(J) [llS] t/A (t-l) + E t Dimana: CFOt = operating cash flow in year
t DISXt = discretionary expense in yeart (selling expense, general and
administrative expense) The third step is calculating the abnormal PROD
(APROD), abnormal CFO (ACFO), and abnormal DISX (ADISX). Abnormal
value is calculated by subtracting the actual value with the predicted
abnormal value (Cohen et aI., 2008). The concept of the calculation is as
follows: Abnormal Level of Cost Production [APROD] _t = [PROD]
~(t-1) D(-) [13_(1_J..1L8_Jt-l) + 13_(~J S t/A (t-1) + 13_(J) [llS
] t/A (t-1) + 13_(1) [llS lL(t-1)~(t-1} ] Which: [APROD] t=
Abnormal Level of Cost Production in year t Abnormal Level of Operating
Cash Flow Normal Level of Discretionary [ACFO] _t = [CFO] t/A (tool)
Expense (DISX) D( - ) HL(lJ....1L8.....(UL±..JL(~ ) S ~(t- [DISX L
~(t-l) D(= 0_(0 ) )+ 1) + lLei) [llS 1 t/A Ct-l) ] 13_(1 ) l/A _Ct-
1) + IL( 2 ) S _(t-l)L A _(t- Which: 1) + E...J [ACFO 1L1
=abnormallevel of Which: operating cash flow in year t 70
TSHupEriINyaFnLiUnEgNsiChE OF AUDIT COMMITTEE CHARACTERISTICS
ON REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AbnormalLevel of Discretionary
Expense M DISX] _t = [DISX :l.-WL(t- 1) D( - ) [13_(L)....1L8.....(t-1) +
13_(2 ) S _Ct-__1)LtL(t:J) ] Which: A [DISX gbnQrm_gL~vel of
discretionary expense lILyear t ComRanies that seek to maniRulate
earnings tend to have higher APROD, while ACFO and ADISX lower. The
final step is combining three sizes of real earnings manipulation into a
proxy named RM. The concept of the calculation is as follows: [RM] _t =
D( [APROD] _t- [ACFO] _t- [ADISX] _t ) which: [RM] _t = Real
earning management in year t Analysis Method Hypothesis testing used
multiple linear regression analysis (multiple regression). Multiple linear
regression analysis aimed to test hvpothesis whether there is influence
between the independent variable on the dependent variable. In general,
multiple linear regression analysis model can be written as follows: I RMt
-I =0+1Ll ACEXPt +U ACSIZEt +U ACTENt +U ACOTHt +0 ROAt
+rLQ SIZEt +IL 6 MBt+ E_(i,t) which: RMt : real earning management a
: constanta 13_(1-6) : coefisien ACEXPt : Financial and accounting
exp-ertise of audit committee members,. as measured by number of
members who have eXRertise orexRerience in the field of accounting and
finance. ACSIZEt : Audit committee size, measured by the number of
audit committee members that exist in every company. ACTENt : Tenure
chairmanof the audit committee, as measured by the number of tenure of
the chairman of the audit committee since the first appointment until the
period of the study ACOTHt : The number of positions that were held QY
the chairman of the audit committee,. measured by the number of
positions that are concurrently chairman of the audit committee, both
within and outside the cOrQQany-,-SIZEt : The size of the company, based
on the natural logarithm of market value. ROAt : Return on asset MBt :
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Market-to-book ratio members (ACEXPt) minimum value is 1.0 and a
maximum value is 3.0 with an average value is 2.261. This suggests that
most on year
£014 has been implement the requirement of the Capital Market
Supervisory Agency and Financial According to Krishnan and Visvanathan
(2008), accounting expertise and financial shared by members of the audit
committee can be interpreted as directors who are or who have been
included in one of the members of the following groups: graduates from
accounting, auditor, certified __Rublic accountant (CPA), QrinciQal or chief
financial officers (CFO), cO~JtrQU~J:,and RliDCir@J or chief accounting
officers (CAO). Institution (BAPEPAM LK), that is at least 1 member who
has accounting and financial expertise.The standard deviation is 0.747
indicates a variation contained in the audit committee financial accounting
expertise. For the variable size of the audit committee (ACSIZEt) minimum
value is 3.0 and a maximum value is 4.0 with an average value is 3.063.
This suggests that most manufacturing companies have implementation
requirements of the CaRital Market SUQervisory-Agency and Financial
Institution (BAPEPAM LK) is a minimum RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Table
2 shows the results of descriptive statistic tests. The results showed that
the number of samples (N) is 111. The maximum value for the variable of
real earnings management (RMt) is1.242, while the minimum value is
0.004. The average value is 0.346. Standard deviation of real earnings
management variable is 0.256 can shows the variation of the value of
inter-company from year to year. For variable accounting and financial
expertise on audit committee have 3 members of audit committee. The
standard deviation is 0.244 indicates a variation contained in the variable
size of the audit committee. For variable tenure chairman of the audit
committee (ACTENt) minimum value is 0.0 and a maximum value is 13.0.
The average value is 5.243 that are shows the majority of the company's
audit committee chairman on manufacture serves more than one period.
The standard deviation is 4.110 indicates a variation contained in this
variable. TSHupEriINyaFnLiUnEgNsiChE OF AUDIT COMMITTEE
CHARACTERISTICS ON REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT For .9.variable
number of positions that were be held by the chairman of the audit
committee (ACOTHt) minimum value is ~ 0 and a maximum value is 1.:. 0
with an average value is 1.532. This indicates that a portion the chairman
of the audit committee have another positions both within the company
and outside the company. The standard deviation is 0.922 indicates the
variation contained in this variable. Table 2 Descriptif Statistic Test Result
Variabel N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation REM 111 0,004 1, 242
Q" 346 Q, 256 ACEXP 111 1,0 3,0 2,261 0,747 ACSIZE 111 3,04,0 3,063
0,244 ACTEN 111 0,0 13,05,2434,110 ACOTH 111 0,0 4,0 1,5320,922
ROA 111 -0,1700,3500,0790,096 SIZE 111 4,143 10,1657,098 1,541
MB 111 -2,695 52,394 3,688 6,563 Source: Secondary data were
processed, 2016; REM:Real earnings management; ACEXP: Financial
accounting eXQertise of audit committee members;, ACSIZE :Audit
committee size; ACTEN: Tenure chairman of the audit committee;, ACOTH
:The number of positions that were lli:ld by: the chairman of the audit
committ2e;, ROA: Return on asset;SIZE:The size of the company; MB:
Market-to-book ratio Table3 shows the results of Variance Inflation Factors
(VIF) for each independent variable to test multicollinearity between each
independent variable. The results shows each independent variable has a
value of VIF is less than 10. Based on these results it can be concluded
that there is no multicollinearity of each independent variable. Table 3 also
shows the test of hypothesis in this research. The following are the results
of testing hypothesis were made: Influence of Financial and Accounting
EXQertise of Audit Committee Members toward the Real Earning~
Management From the test results have shown the value of the variable
probability of financial accounting expertise of audit committee members
is smaller than the 0.05 level that is equal to 0.019 (0.019 <0.05). This
means that the variable financial accounting expertise of audit committee
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members significantly affect the real earnings management. However, the
direction coefficient indicates a positive direction. The results of this test
mean thclt the financial accounting~2merti5e of audit committee members
to make real earnings management increases. Thus hypothesis 1 which
states that "financialand accounting expertise of audit committee members
negatively affect the real earnings management" is rejected. Based on the
Decree of Chairman of BaReRam Number: KeR.::29/ PM / 2004 states that
have at least one member with e>;Rertise in accounting and finance.
Although most of the com[.?anies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchang~
has followed the rules has not yet been able to reduce their earnings
management. The results can be seen by the average value for the
variable financial accounting expertise (ACEXPt) of 2.261. The value of the
average shows that most companies have members with eXRertise in
accounting and finance more than one person. The large number of
members with expertise in the financial and accounting rather than
reducing earningsmanagement, but instead make more practice
earningsmanagement in the company's. This can be due to the audit
committee members who do not have an educational background in
accounting or finance considered to have the ability in the field of
accounting and finance when to audit committee. In
adJjitiQJ1JJJe appointment of to be the chairman of
the audit committee independence is questionable. Problems
independence and expertise in accounting and finance may cause the audit
committee is more likely to side with management when there is
disagreement between management and the external auditor. Therefore,
earnings management conducted by the management because support
from the audit committee. This condition may cause financial accounting
eXRertise of audit committee members have positive influence on earning2
management of real (Sanjaya, 2008 in Ariyani 2011). Influence of Audit
Committee Size toward Real Earnings Management From the test results
have shown the value of the variable probability of audit committee size is
smaller than the significant level of 0.05, which is equal to 0.000 (0.000
<0.05). This means that the variable audit committee size significantly
affect the real earnings management. However, the direction coefficient of
the audit committee size showed a positive direction. The results of this
test mean that the audit committee size make real earnings management
increases. Therefore, hypothesis 2 which states that "the audit committee
size negatively affect the real earnings management" is rejected. Based on
the Decree of Chairman of BaReRam Number: KeR.::29/ PM / 2004 stated
that the establishment of an audit THE INFLUENCE OF AUDIT COMMITTEE
CHARACTERISTICS ON REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT Supriyaningsih
Fuad Diponegoro University committee must have at least three members.
Although the average company is already implementing these rules, it still
has not been able to reduce their real earnings management activities.
The results showed that the audit committee size would increase the
occurrence of earnings management. It can be caused due to the small
number of audit committee members. The number of members is too little
can cause problems due to the lack of division of duties of members
(Klein, 2012). This leads to make supervision toward management when
financial reporting processes less qualified, this condition allows
management doing fraud. This condition may cause the audit committee
size is a positive influence on real earnings management. Influence of
Tenure Chairmanof the Audit Committee toward Real Earnings
Management From the test results have shown the value of the variable
probability tenure chairman of the audit committee is greater than the
significant level of Q.,. 05, which amounted to 0.772 (0.722> 0.05). This
means that the variable tenure of audit committee chairman does not
affect the real earnings management. Therefore hypothesis 3 which states
that "the tenure of audit committee chairman negatively affect the real
earnings management" has been rejected. The long duration appointment
chairman of the audit committee is apparently not affecting the earnings
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management. This can be due to a decline in the performance chairman of
the audit committee. This performance degradation can be caused by the
chairman of the audit committee has to know about the company's
condition, so that the chairman of the audit committee have felt no need
to work hard again to oversee the management. The action taken by the
chairman of the audit committee could lead to other audit committee
members to do the same. It can create an audit committee is no longer
effective when oversee management to the financial reporting process.
This condition may lead to tenure chairman of the audit committee has no
effect on earnings management. Influence of Number of Positions that
were be held 12.'1.the Chairman of the Audit Committee toward the Real
Earnings Management From the test results have shown a probability
value of a variable number of positions that were held chairman
ti1e audit cQ[lliT,jt~s>;~ is smaller than 1.hr~significant 0.05, which
amounted to 0.045 (0.045 <0.05). This means that a variable number of
positions that were held by the chairman of the audit committee
significantly affect the real earnings management. In addition, the
direction coefficient of the size of the audit committee showed a negative
direction. The results of this test mean that the number of positions that
were held by the chairman of the audit committee makes real earnings
management is reduced. Therefore hypothesis 4 which states that "the
number of positions that were held by the chairman of the audit
committee negatively affect the real earnings management" are accepted.
Based on the average value for a variable number of positions that were
held by the chairman of the audit committee (ACOTHt) that is equal to
1.532 with a maximum value is 4.0 and a minimum value is !L 0 indicates
that the majority. of th~ chairman of the audit committee has more than
one position. A large number of positions that were held by the chairman
of the audit committee were effective for reducing their earnings
manipulation carried out by the management. A large number of positions
that were held hy. the chairman of the audit committee are made
chairman of the audit committee more experienced as it faces a different
situation for every company where he worked. With the experience, of
course, that isenhancing the knowledge and eXRertise of the chairman of
the audit committee. Increasing the expertise and experience is the basis
for the chairman of the audit committee to motivate members to work
better. With so many positions that were held by the chairman of the audit
committee" pointed out that the chairman of the audit committee also
has a good reputation, so of course the chairman of the audit committee
will give Q maximum contribution to the company. Therefore, oversight
toward management will increase and reduce manipulation practice by
management. Table 4 Hypothesis Test Result Variables B t Variance
Inflation Factor (Constant) ACEXPt ACSIZEt ACTENt ACOTHt ROAt SIZEt
MBt -0,8980,061 0,3280,001 -0,040 1,732 -0,002 0,009 -3,760 2,378**
4,212* 0,291 -2,033** 8,136* -0,1543,080* 1,311 1,272 1,183 1,134
1,478 1,711 1,259 THE INFLUENCE OF AUDIT COMMITTEE
CHARACTERISTICS ON REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT Supriyaningsih
Fuad Diponegoro University Source: Secondary data were processed,
2016; *: significant at level 0,01; **: significant at level 0,05; Real
earnings management: dependent variable; ACEXP: Financial accounting
eXRertise of audit cOfDmittee member's;, ACSIZE: Audit committee size;
ACTEN: Tenure chairman of the audit comrnittee;, ACOTH: The number of
positions that were held by-.!;he chairman of the audit committee;, ROA:
Return on asset;SIZE: The size of the company; MB: Market-to-book ratio
CONCLUSION The RurRose of this study is to examine the influence of the
characteristics of the audit committee toward real earnings management.
This is their conclusion based on the analysis of data that has been
described in previous chapters: 1. The first characteristic ofaudit
committee, that is financial and accounting,J~2mertise of audit committee
members. The results show the financial and accounting_~2mertise of audit
committee members has significant positive effect on real earnings
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management. 2. The second characteristic of audit committee, thatis audit
committee size. The results showed that the audit committee size has
significant Ros:tive effect on real earnings r)k:nagement. 3. The third
characteristics of audit committee that isthe audit committee tenure. The
results showed that the tenure of the audit committee has no significant
effect on real earnings management. 4. The fourth characteristic of audit
committee, which is the number of positions that were held by' the
chairman of the audit committee. The results showed that the number of
positions that were be held by the chairman of the audit committee has
significant negative effect on the real earnings management. Research
conducted has weakness and limitations that reduce the perfection of
research results. The next research is expected to pay attention to the
limitations of this study. Limitations of this study are: 1. Many companies
do not attach the complete information related to the audit committee in
the annual report, so it cannot be sampled. 2. The sample of companies
used as a research object only manufacturing company, so it has not been
able to include results for all companies listed on the Indonesian Stock
Exchange. 3. The result has not been able LOQ.£ ..c).YJSic CfT1Qir"icalevidenCE,:
toward tenure thQ chief of variable. Future studies are
expected to present the results of a higher quality and accurate by
watching that is some suggestion: 1. Future studies may use different
sample other than manufacturing companies, such as financial companies
and banks due to the financial sector has different characteristics with the
company on manufacture. 2. The next research can add variables to the
characteristics of the audit committee, such as the frequency of audit
committee meetings, the independence of the audit committee, and so
on. This is because there are many variables that can be used to explain
the relationship of audit committee characteristics and earning~
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HOW MANDATORY IFRS ADOPTION CHANGES 
FIRMS’ OPPORTUNISTIC BEHAVIOR: EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCES FROM THE EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
PERSPECTIVE 
Fuad, Diponegoro University 
Wahyu Tri Wijanarto, Diponegoro University 
ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this research is to examine the effects of International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS)-based accounting standards on both accrual-based and real 
earnings management. We utilized modified Jones model as a proxy for accrual based 
earnings management, while abnormalities found on cash flow from operations, 
discretionary expenses and production expenses are used as proxies for real earnings 
management. Using data from Indonesian manufacturing firms from 2009 to 2014, we found 
that adoption of IFRS limits discretionary behaviour in earnings management while the 
earnings management from real activities is more prevalent in the post IFRS period.  
Keywords: IFRS, Real Earnings Management, Accrual Earnings Management, Panel Data 
Analysis. 
INTRODUCTION 
Managerial opportunistic behaviour in the scope of financial reporting has become 
one of the main concerns for years. Agency theory has long argued that when the ownership 
and management are separated, the accounting and operational functions are affected by 
agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and increase the information asymmetry 
between principal and managers. As a consequence, managers may have the incentive to 
make decisions to fulfil their interest while to some extent, neglecting the interests of 
principal. Earnings management practice is one of those activities as a result of agency 
conflicts.  
Numerous researches have tried to uncover the reasons (and consequences) of the 
earnings management practice. However, we emphasized the roles of accounting standards 
that may inhibit (or foster) managerial opportunistic behaviour through earnings 
management.  
International Financial Reporting Standards was gradually implemented in Indonesia 
since 2012 in a hope to increase accounting and financial reporting quality. Researches 
however are stand divided about this. For example, more flexible accounting standard as in 
IFRS provides a greater scope for the discretion policy and involve a higher degree of 
subjectivity implied in the application of criteria (Jeanjean and Stolowy, 2008). These 
“flexible” rules encourage managers to have a broader space in applying their policies that 
can be used for their own interests if there is no effective control mechanism. Callao and 
Jarne (2010) maintained that firms regulated by the “loose” accounting standards tend to 
engage more earnings management (Callao and Jarne, 2010). Additional evidences showed 
that the principle-based accounting standards in IFRS provides more flexibility and hence 
looser as compared to the competing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) which 
is known to be “rules-based”. Capkun et al. (2012) also documented that earnings 
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management increase can be observed among the companies in the countries that allow early 
IFRS adoption.  
However, Pelucio-Grecco et al. (2014) found that IFRS have restricted effect on 
earnings management in Brazil after the full implementation of IFRS. Sellami and Fakhfakh 
(2014) on the other hand found that there is a decrease in the value of the absolute 
discretionary accruals during the six years after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in France. 
Doukakis et al. (2014) shows that mandatory IFRS does not significantly affect the level of 
accrual and real earnings management. 
Our research on the other hand, does not attempt to test whether there is a blessing (or 
curse) after IFRS implementation. Rather, we try to uncover the earnings management 
practices on the accrual properties of accounting and manager’s tendencies to manage their 
reported earnings through real operational activities; which are also one of our contributions 
in the financial accounting literature. Healy (1999) maintained that accrual-based earnings 
management are usually conducted by using extensive judgment in preparing the financial 
reporting and modifying financial transactions to mislead the users of financial statements 
about the firms’ real performance. Roychowdury (2006) on the other hand, define real 
earnings management as management desire to mislead the users of financial reporting by 
manipulating the operational activities that are supposed to in normal fashion. Our 
contributions also stem from the fact that the impact of IFRS to real earnings management is 
categorized into their three main activities, namely: abnormal production costs, abnormal net 
cash flow from operations and abnormal discretionary expenses. We also test whether IFRS 
may inhibit or foster those activities 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a review of 
relevant literature and hypotheses development. Section 3 describes the sample selection, 
variable measurement and research design. Section 4 presents the result. Section 5 provides 
summary conclusions, limitation of this study and future research potentials. 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
Earlier researches have documented that IFRS may change how management behaves 
in managing their earnings. For example, Christensen et al. (2008) found that income 
smoothing is significantly lower among the firms that voluntarily adopt IFRS prior to its 
effective date. They further found that mandatory adopters perceive that the cost of early 
adoption outweighs its benefits. However, Capkun et al. (2012) noted that earnings 
management increased can be observed among the firms that voluntarily adopt IFRS. 
Further studies have also documented the impacts of IFRS adoption (or convergence) 
on accounting quality. Chen et al. (2010) for instance, found a convincing evidence of 
earnings management and absolute discretionary accruals and variations of unexplained 
accruals. Furthermore, they documented that IFRS encourages companies to engage in 
income smoothing practices. On the other hand, Aussenegg et al. (2008) using the sample 
from 17 European countries found that earnings management decrease can be observed 
among the firms following IFRS adoption as opposed to countries-specific (i.e., domestic) 
standards.  
Firms also possess another alternative to manage their earnings through manipulating 
their real operational activities. Graham et al. (2005) conducted a survey indicating that 
managers prefer real earnings management instead of accrual-based earnings management. 
Empirical measures of Roychowdhury (2006) also showed that the avoidance of losses 
reporting by the managers can be used through manipulation of their real activities 
management. A study conducted by Zang (2012) found the trade-off and substitution between 
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accrual-based and real earnings management. She also documented a negative correlation 
between accrual and real earnings management.  
IFRS Adoption and Accrual Earnings Management 
As previously mentioned, IFRS provides inherent flexibility in applying the assets 
estimation through, for example, fair values method. This flexibility is provided through 
various alternatives in depreciation methods, inventory and revenue recognition, among 
others. Therefore, IFRS may provide broader room for the managers to achieve and set 
particular earnings that is not provided by prior, GAAP-based standards.  
Prior researches, to some extent also concur with the above lemma. For example, 
Jeanjean and Stolowy (2008) analysing the deviation of the income distribution as a proxy of 
earnings management examined the impact of IFRS on three countries (i.e., Australia, United 
Kingdom and France). They found that earnings management in those countries are not 
declining and even increasing in France. Callao and Jarne (2010) also showed that the 
earnings management increased since the adoption of IFRS in 11 countries in Europe. Using 
data in New Zealand from 2002-2009, Kabir et al. (2010) found that discretionary accruals 
are higher after the adoption of IFRS and shows a lower quality of earnings at the time of 
IFRS implementation as compared to the pre IFRS. Therefore, we state our first hypothesis as 
follows: 
H1: Accrual earnings management practices are higher after IFRS convergence 
IFRS Adoption and Real Earnings Management 
Indeed, better accounting standards guarantee a better accounting quality, where they 
may increase the value relevance of financial reporting and earnings variability, among 
others. This will also yield that the firms’ financial reporting can be easily scrutinized by the 
auditors and regulators. As a consequence, firms may opt to engage in real earnings 
management as it is more difficult to detect when they try to manage their earnings rather 
than using accruals.  
Earlier researches have also noted that IFRS may increase the real management 
activities. One of the notable researches include Lippens (2008) that tested both real and 
accrual-based earnings management for the firms in EU countries following mandatory IFRS 
adoption. He expected that the rate of accrual earnings management will increase in the 
period after mandatory adoption of IFRS and level of real earnings management will decline 
during the period. However, using the periods of 2000-2006 he showed that level of accrual 
and real earnings management increase significantly in the period after mandatory adoption 
of IFRS. In a survey study, Graham et al. (2005) found that managers prefer managing 
earnings through real activities than through accrual policy. This is in line with Zang (2012) 
stating that the manager doing the manipulation of earnings through real activities first and 
then adjust the level of target profit by the use of discretionary accrual policies. Hence, the 
following hypothesis is proposed: 
H2: earnings management through real operational manipulation increases after firms adopt IFRS 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Sample Selection 
 The population in this study includes all manufacturing listed firm in Indonesian 
Stock Exchange from 2009-2014.The study excludes observations with negative book value 
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of equity and missing values. Data was taken from audited financial statement and annual 
report of the firm that publish at Indonesian Stock Exchange website (http://www.idx.com). 
As a result, we found a balanced sample set consist of 438 observation. 
Accrual Earnings Management Measure 
 In this research, accrual earnings management is calculated using Modified Jones 
Models developed by Dechow et al. (1995). They showed that Modified Jones Model is way 
better in earnings management detection rather than the original Jones model. They further 
also further added the change in account receivable in order to control for the possibility to 
use revenue as a source of earnings management. Modified Jones Models based on Dechow 
et al. (1995) are as follows: 
TAit/Assetsit-1=α0(1/Assetsit-1)+α1(ΔSalesit/Assetsit-1)+α2(GPPEit/Assetsit-1)+εit                     (1) 
where TAit=total accruals, which is calculated as firm net income minus cash flows 
from operations; Assetsit-1=total assets for firm; ∆Salesit=change in sales; GPPEit=gross 
property, plant and equipment. 
 Estimated parameters from (1) are then used to estimate the firm-specific 
nondiscretionary accruals (NDAit): 
 
NDAit=α0(1/Assetsit-1)+α1(ΔSalesit/Assetsit-1–ΔARit/Assetsit-1)+α2(GPPEit/Assetsit-1)           (2) 
 
Where NDAit=non-discretionary accruals; ∆ARit=change in accounts receivable from 
year t-1 to year t, while all other variables are as previously defined. 
We use discretionary accruals (DA) which is the difference between total accruals and 
the fitted nondiscretionary accruals to measure accrual earnings management, which is 
defined as 
DAit=(TAit/Assetsit-1)–NDAit            (3) 
Where DAit=discretionary accruals for firm i in year t. 
Real Earnings Management Measure 
Roychowdury (2006) defined real earnings management as the difference in operating 
practices with normal operating practice, motivated by the desire of management to mislead 
stakeholders so that they believe that the purpose of a particular financial reporting have been 
achieved in the normal operation practice of the company. Some areas that can be exploited 
in real activities manipulation include overproduction, sales management and reduction of 
discretionary expense. 
We use the following regression models for earnings management in three possible 
areas, including production (PROD), sales management (CFO) and discretionary expense 
reduction (DIEXP) is as follows: 
 
PRODit/Ait-1=α0+β1(1/Ait-1)+β2(Sit/Ait-1)+β3(ΔSit/Ait-1)+β4(ΔSit-1/Ait-1)+εit  (4) 
 
CFOit/Ait-1=α0+β1(1/Ait-1)+β2(Sit/Ait-1)+β3(ΔSit/Ait-1)+εit     (5) 
 
DISXit/Ait-1=α0+β1(1/Ait-1)+β2(Sit-1/Ait-1)+εit         (6) 
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where PRODit equals to production costs, which is the cost of goods sold plus 
inventories yearly change; CFOit is firms’ cash flows from operations; DISXit is discretionary 
expenses that is measured as selling, general and administrative expenses and Ait-1 is firms’ 
total assets; and ∆Sit=yearly sales changes. 
As with prior researches, this study used the residuals found in equations (4), (5) and 
(6) to measure abnormal production cost (ABN_PROD), abnormal net cash flow from 
operations (ABC_CFO) and abnormal value of discretionary expenses (ABN_DISEXP), 
respectively. 
 In line with Zang (2012) and Cohen and Zarowin (2010), among others, the value of 
ABN_CFO and ABN DISX are multiplied by -1 so that the higher value indicates the higher 
manipulation through price discounts and cutting discretionary expenses. To test the second 
hypothesis, we use the summated, composite score. We also run sensitivity tests, in which 
real earnings management proxies are separately regressed on IFRS. 
Panel Data Regression 
 Panel data regression was used to test our hypotheses, since our study employs cross 
sectional firms and multiple years. Using panel regression analysis for these 
multidimensional types of data gives more efficient estimate (Baltagi 2005). Furthermore, 
with the panel data analysis, the unobserved heterogeneity both in time as well companies 
can also be controlled. The panel regression models are tested based on the following models: 
 
ABS_DA=α0+α1IFRSit+α2BIG4it+α3GROWTHit+α4SIZEit+α5 LEVit+α6ROEit+α7REALit+εit
             (7) 
REAL=α0+α1IFRSit+α2 BIG4it+α3GROWTHit+α4SIZEit+α5 LEVit+α6ROEit+α7ABS_DAit+εit   
(8) 
where ABS_DA=absolute value of accrual earnings management; REAL=total value 
of real earnings management; IFRS=dummy variable, 1 for 2012-2014 periods and 0 
otherwise. We used several control variables including growth (GROWTH), audit size 
(BIG4) financial leverage (LEV), firm size (SIZE) and profitability (ROE). BIG4 is a dummy 
variable indicating that whether the firms hired a Big 4 auditor, GROWTH is measured as the 
sales change to control for the growth on earnings management. In order to control for the 
effect of firm size on earnings management, we measure SIZE as the natural logarithm of 
firm’s market value. LEV is the firm’s financial leverage which is the proportion of total 
liabilities to as the ratio of total liabilities to prior year’s total assets. Return on equity (ROE) 
is measured as the net income over last year’s shareholders equity. Researches (for example 
Doukakis 2014 and Zang 2012) have also concluded that real earnings management is 
conducted when firms do not have enough flexibility in earnings management through 
accrual discretions. Therefore, we also use accrual-based earnings management (ABS_DA) 
as one of the control variables for the real earnings management regression. 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics of model are shown on the Table 1. The variable ABS_DA 
indicates an average of 0.108 which means that the average value of accruals that generated 
by management discretion compared to the previous year assets on manufacturing company 
in Indonesia. Our study also indicates that 40.6% of our sample was being audited by BIG4. 
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The variable sales growth (GROWTH) have an average value of 0.097 which shows that the 
average sales increase against the previous year on manufacturing company in Indonesia is 




  N Mean Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. 
REAL 438 1.113 2.783 -0.152 0.499 
ABS_DA 438 0.108 0.416 0.001 0.074 
SIZE 438 21.131 25.17 18.060 1.482 
GROWTH 438 0.097 0.800 -0.499 0.183 
LEV 438 0.451 0.914 0.0413 0.193 
ROE 438 0.124 0.591 -0.271 0.117 
IFRS 438 0.500 1.000 0.000 0.500 
BIG4 438 0.406 1.000 0.000 0.491 
Notes: ABS_DA: Accrual Earnings Management; REAL: Total Real Earnings Management; IFRS: IFRS 
Adoption, Dummy 1 after IFRS Adoption from Year 2012-2014, 0 Prior to IFRS Adoption from Year 2009-
2011; BIG4: Type of Auditor, Dummy 1 Audited by BIG4, 0 Audited by Non BIG4; GROWTH: Sales Growth; 
SIZE: Firm Size; LEV: Leverage; ROE: Return on Equity  
 
The correlation statistics which are displayed in Table 2 showed that discretionary 
accrual has a positive relationship with real earnings management. On the other hand, the real 
earnings management is negatively correlated with the audit size (BIG4) and profitability 




  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 ABS_DA 1 
       
2 REAL 0.143*** 1 
      
3 IFRS 0.037 0.027 1 
     
4 BIG4 -0.021 -0.200*** 0.028 1 
    
5 SIZE 0.006 -0.082 0.134*** 0.344*** 1 
   
6 GROWTH 0.076 -0.054 0.073 0.008 0.082 1 
  
7 LEV 0.066 0.479*** -0.015 -0.180*** 0.247*** 0.038 1 
 
8 ROE 0.027 -0.109** -0.140*** 0.249*** 0.060 0.235*** -0.182*** 1 
Source: EVIEWS output, 2016 
** significant at the 0.05 level 
*** significant at the 0.01 level 
Panel Regression 
 Table 3 presents the regression analysis results of regression model (7) and regression 
model (8). Our statistics indicate that the models satisfy all the classical assumptions. For 
example, as appeared in Table 3 the VIF scores are all less than 10, indicating no serious 
multicollinearity issue. We also corrected the standard errors for their possible biases due to 
heteroscedasticity using the White’s method. As been highlighted earlier, we also conducted 
the Hausman test to control for time and cross sectional heterogeneity. The tests indicate that 
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fixed effect model is used for the discretionary accrual and random effect model is used for 
the real earnings management.  
On the first model where the dependent variable is the accrual earnings management 
the adjusted R-squared value is 0.489. This indicates that the discretionary accrual is 
explained by the variation of IFRS and all the control variables (BIG4, SIZE, GROWTH, 
LEV, ROE and REAL) by 48.9%. F-statistics (6.292) for this is also significant at 1% 
indicating that all the variables significantly affect discretionary accrual. 
 The first hypothesis (H1) is regarding the adoption of IFRS that may have a positive 
association with the change in accrual earnings management practices. Our regression results 
showed that IFRS adoption has a lower discretionary accrual by 2.1% as compared to the 
firms that have yet to implement IFRS (t-value=-2.713). Surprisingly, our finding cannot 
confirm our hypothesis that earnings management is increased after IFRS convergence. 
Rather we found that inverse association in which earnings management is reduced following 
IFRS convergence. 
We also test whether real earnings management is increased after the infusion of 
IFRS. The Adjusted R-squared of this particular model is 0.259. In this regards, we found 
that real earnings management is higher in the post IFRS implementation by 5.2% as 
compared to the prior IFRS implementation (t-value=2.522; p=0.0120).  
 
Table 3 
REGRESSION RESULTS FROM THE POOLED SAMPLE 
  Estimate (t-value) 
Variance Inflation Factors 
(VIF) 
 
ABS_DA REAL ABS_DA REAL 
Constant -1.572*** (-4.646) 2.400*** (4.009)   
IFRS -0.021*** (-2.714) 0.052** (2.522) 1.068 1.062 
BIG4 -0.020 (-0.858) -0.070 (-0.997) 1.298 1.296 
SIZE 0.070*** (4.422) -0.076*** (-2.844) 1.370 1.311 
GROWTH 0.005 (0.297) -0.219*** (-3.549) 1.093 1.090 
LEV 0.035 (0.815) 0.476*** (4.031) 1.596 1.205 
ROE 0.145*** (2.673) -0.213 (-1.323) 1.202 1.201 





1.484*** (8.833)  1.012 
Adjusted R² 0.489 0.259   
F-statistic 6.292*** 22.827***   
Hausman Prob 0.00 1.00   
Source: EVIEWS output, 2016 
Notes: ABS_DA: Accrual Earnings Management; REAL: Total Real Earnings Management; IFRS: IFRS 
Adoption, a dummy variable in which 1 is after IFRS adoption from year 2012-2014, 0 prior IFRS adoption 
from year 2009-2011; BIG4: Auditor Type, a dummy variable in which 1 is audited by BIG4 and 0 otherwise; 
GROWTH: Sales Growth; SIZE: Firm Size; LEV: Leverage; ROE: Return on Equity  
** significant at the 0.05 level 
*** significant at the 0.01 level 
However, as sensitivity tests, when we decompose the real earnings management intro 
its three known activities, we found that Earnings management is lowered in the post IFRS 
implementation only from sales management activities (i.e., abnormal cash flow from 
operations, ABN CFO, t=-1.962) and reduction of discretionary expenses (AB_DISEXP, t=-
3.135). Nevertheless, we cannot find that real earnings management through over production 
(ABN_PROD) is different in the post, vis a vis, pre IFRS implementation (t=0.348) (Table 4). 
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Table 4 
REGRESSION RESULTS FOR INDIVIDUAL PROXIES REAL EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
  ABN_CFO ABN_PROD ABN_DISEXP 
Constant 0.023(0.251) -1.412***(-3.507) -5.806***(-6.549) 
IFRS -0.011*(-1.962) 0.003(0.348) -0.068***(-3.135) 
BIG4 0.036***(2.754) 0.006(0.165) 0.090(1.099) 
SIZE 0.003(0.646) 0.060***(3.157) 0.222***(5.263) 
GROWTH -0.070***(-4.449) 0.041**(1.986) 0.318***(6.885) 
LEV -0.150***(-5.518) 0.250***(4.987) 0.137(1.245) 
ROE 0.403***(11.237) -0.374***(-6.648) -0.443***(-3.581) 
REAL 
   
ABS_DA -0.756***(-17.618) 0.269***(4.472) -0.519***(-3.922) 
Adjusted R² 0.540 0.893 0.857 
F-statistic 74.383*** 47.084*** 34.280*** 
Source: EVIEWS output, 2016 
Notes: ABN_CFO: Abnormal Value of Cash Flow from Operation; ABN_PROD: Abnormal Value of 
Production; ABN_DISEXP: Abnormal Value of Discretional Expenses; ABS_DA: Accrual Earnings 
Management; REAL: Total Riil Earnings Management; IFRS: IFRS Adoption, dummy 1 after IFRS adoption 
from year 2012-2014, 0 before IFRS adoption from year 2009-2011; BIG4: Type of Auditor, dummy 1 audited 
by BIG4, 0 audited by non BIG4; GROWTH: Sales Growth; SIZE: Firm Size; LEV: Leverage; ROE: Return on 
Equity 
  * significant at the 0.10 level 
** significant at the 0.05 level 
*** significant at the 0.01 level 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 This study tests the impacts of mandatory IFRS adoption on earnings management 
from Indonesian manufacturing firms. Although prior researches have put serious attention 
on how IFRS may affect the earnings management behaviour, but they tend to focus more on 
accrual-based earnings management. This study however tries to focus both on accounting 
(i.e., discretionary accrual) and operational aspects of earnings management, namely real 
earnings management. 
 Based on a sample of 438 observations from Indonesian Stock Exchange (IDX) for 
fiscal years of 2009 to 2014, we found several interesting findings. First, adoption of IFRS 
has a negative association with accrual earnings management. It means therefore, there is a 
decrease in the level of discretionary accruals on manufacturing companies in Indonesia after 
a period of implementation of IFRS. In line with Doukakis (2014), the implementation of 
IFRS may increase the firm’s transparency and improve the overall quality of financial 
reporting. In this case, analysts, investors, capital market authority are at better position to 
evaluate and monitor firms’ accounting quality and may make informed decision based on 
firms’ accounting options and basic assumptions. As a consequence, managers may not be at 
ease to falsify or manipulate its performance in their financial reports. Zeghal (2012) also 
mentioned that the adoption of IFRS improves the quality of earnings by limiting the 
selection of management decision by eliminating allowed accounting alternative and provide 
a more consistent approach to accounting measurements. The results of this study are also 
consistent with a research conducted by Sellami and Fakhfakh (2014) and Brad et al. (2006) 
that found the adoption of IFRS tend to decrease the earnings management practice based on 
discretionary accruals.  
 In contrary, we found that real earnings management tend to be higher in the post 
IFRS period. A trade-off explanation is provided by Cohen et al. (2008) maintain that a 
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decline in one type of earnings management may be because of the substitution of another 
method of earnings management had already occurred. A survey conducted by Graham 
(2005) also indicate that managers prefer engaging in real earnings management practice 
rather than accrual earnings management, as real activities directly affect the cash flow 
(Cohen and Zarowin 2010). Cohen and Zarowin (2010) also provide further justifications the 
reasons real earnings management is preferred. As previously mentioned, aggressive accrual 
earnings management may lead to higher risk of surveillance by the auditor and perhaps, 
regulators. Second, less flexibility is available when the firms engage in accrual earnings 
management (i.e., less slack in discretionary accrual for the following periods). This finding 
also in-line with Zang (2012) that examined the effect of trade-offs between accrual earnings 
management and real earnings management and generate a negative relationship between 
both earnings management.  
Like any other research, this study has also some limitations which is necessary to be 
mentioned. First, observation on this research is the manufacturing sector. Thus, this research 
has yet to represent the overall corporate sector in Indonesia Stock Exchange. Second, we do 
not properly (and comprehensively) test the presence of the trade-off between real earnings 
management and accrual based earnings management and whether the trade-offs prevails 
following IFRS adoption. We leave this interesting area for further research. Third, due to 
data availability, we do not differentiate mandatory vs. voluntary adopters of IFRS and thus 
their respective outcomes to the earnings management are left unexplored. Fourth, it is also 
interesting to examine the real earnings management using alternative proxies such as long-
term asset sales, stock options, stock repurchases and structuring investment transactions and 
corporate fundings. 
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